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Doubt, disbelief, and skepticism have become important topics in the 
study of medieval Europe. Following a seminal article by the historian 
Susan Reynolds, medievalists from many disciplines have examined a 
range of tendencies often grouped together under the unlovely but 
encompassing term “unbelief.”2 They are engaged in an important 
project. In the overall historiography of Europe and the West, skeptical 
inquiry founded on the rejection of any kind of unquestioning belief 
has long stood as a hallmark of modernity, set against an enduring 
stereotype of the Middle Ages as credulous, superstitious, and 
altogether irrational.3 A significant level of sophistication in dealing 
with intellectual or epistemological uncertainty is often thought to have 
                                                 
1 Iowa State University, USA. 
Portions of this essay were presented at a seminar at King’s College, Cambridge, in June 
2019. I thank John Arnold and Miri Rubin for organizing the seminar and hosting me, 
and all the participants for their valuable feedback. Additional thanks to John Arnold, 
who later very helpfully commented on the full essay. 
2 Susan Reynolds, “Social Mentalities and the Cases of Medieval Scepticism,” 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th series, vol. 1 (1991): 21-41. For an objection 
to the term “unbelief,” see Dorothea Weltecke, “Beyond Religion: On the Lack of 
Belief during the Central and Later Middle Ages,” in Religion and Its Other: Secular and 
Sacral Concepts and Practices in Interaction, ed. Heike Bock, Jörg Fuechter, and Michi 
Knecht (Frankfurt: Campus, 2009), 101-14. Weltecke, “Der Narr spricht: Es ist kein Got”: 
Atheismus, Unglauben und Glaubenszweifel vom 12. Jahrhundert bis zur Neuzeit (Frankfurt: 
Campus, 2010), also discusses terminology at various points, esp. 257-95. 
3 Reynolds, “Social Mentalities,” 22; John H. Arnold, Belief und Unbelief in Medieval Europe 
(London: Hodder Arnold, 2005), 4; Sabina Flanagan, Doubt in an Age of Faith: Uncertainty 
in the Long Twelfth Century (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008), 1; Peter Dinzelbacher, Unglaube im 
“Zeitalter des Glaubens”: Atheismus und Skeptizismus im Mittelalter (Badenweiler: Bachmann, 
2009), 1-2; Frances Andrews, “Introduction,” in Doubting Christianity: The Church and 
Doubt, ed. Frances Andrews, Charlotte Metheun, and Andrew Spicer, Studies in Church 
History 52 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 1-16, at 3. Studies of 
unbelief in antiquity also take this point as their frame: see Tim Whitmarsh, Battling the 
Gods: Atheism in the Ancient World (New York: Knopf, 2015), 4-5. 
DOI: 10.22618/TP.HMWR.20201.383.006
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emerged only in the early modern period, if not later.4 Such notions 
remain a prime example of how, in the words of one expert, almost no 
other periodization in history carries so much consequence as the 
divide between the “medieval” and the “modern,” largely because that 
division functions “less as a historical marker than as a massive value 
judgment.”5 
Thus far, skepticism or outright disbelief in magic have played only 
a small role in the emerging scholarship on medieval unbelief. John 
Arnold gives some space to magical practices in his expansive treatment 
of Belief and Unbelief in Medieval Europe, for example, and Matteo Duni 
has examined late medieval skepticism about witchcraft in his 
contribution to a recent collection on religious doubt.6 Magical 
practices could engender manifold uncertainties, however, ranging from 
whether they were real or illusory in their effects, to whether their 
power might be natural or demonic, leading ultimately to the question 
of whether they were potentially tolerable or invariably illicit. The very 
terminology surrounding magic is often slippery and elusive, creating 
problems for both medieval authorities and modern scholars.7 
That these profound dilemmas have yet to be fully integrated into 
the study of unbelief in the Middle Ages is perhaps not surprising given 
that, aside from the matter of legal and intellectual condemnation, 
studies of medieval magic themselves often skirt questions of essential 
                                                 
4 Dallas G. Denery II, “Uncertainty and Deception in the Medieval and Early Modern 
Court,” in Uncertain Knowledge: Scepticism, Relativism, and Doubt in the Middle Ages, ed. 
Dallas G. Denery II, Kantik Gosh, and Nicolette Zeeman (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014), 
13-36, at 15-18. 
5 Margreta de Grazia, “The Modern Divide: From Either Side,” Journal of Medieval and 
Early Modern Studies 37 (2007): 453-67, at 453; see also Kathleen Davis, Periodization and 
Sovereignty: How Ideas of Feudalism and Secularization Govern the Politics of Time (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 5-6. 
6 Arnold, Belief and Unbelief, 96-99; Duni, “Doubting Witchcraft: Theology, Jurists, 
Inquisitors during the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries,” in Doubting Christianity, 203-
31. Other examples include Paolo Golinelli, Il Medioevo degli increduli: Miscredenti, beffatori, 
anticlericali (Milan: Mursia, 2009), esp. 29-43; while Carol Lansing treats magical fraud in 
her essay “Popular Belief and Heresy,” in A Companion to the Medieval World, ed. Carol 
Lansing and Edward D. English (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 276-92. 
7 This issue is confronted directly by Richard Kieckhefer, “Rethinking How to Define 
Magic,” in The Routledge History of Medieval Magic, ed. Sophie Page and Catherine Rider 
(London: Routledge, 2019), 15-25; Claire Fanger, “For Magic: Against Method,” ibid., 
26-36; Bernd-Christian Otto, “A Discourse Historical Approach Towards Medieval 
Learned Magic,” ibid., 37-47; and David L. d’Avray, “The Concept of Magic,” ibid., 48-56. 
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credulity or skepticism.8 Yet such questions are essential. Disbelief in 
magic – that is, the putative rejection of magical beliefs and practices as 
matters of serious intellectual concern – has played an enormous role in 
establishing the fraught divide between the medieval and the modern to 
which I have already alluded. The very scope of the issue, though, has 
led to a certain degree of scholarly fatigue. 
To put the matter curtly, scholars of magic have long since grown 
disenchanted with Max Weber’s notion of the disenchantment of the 
world (Entzauberung der Welt). In fairness, Weber himself was never 
entirely enamored with this concept, and he never developed it at 
length.9 That left subsequent scholars an evocative but loosely defined 
term with which to play. Despite the fact that Europe’s major witch 
hunts were a decidedly early modern phenomenon afflicting both 
Catholic and Protestant lands, many continued to associate 
disenchantment primarily with the Reformation, as Weber seemed to 
have indicated, until R. W. Scribner effectively undermined that 
relationship.10 Others placed the moment of disenchantment in the 
Scientific Revolution or Enlightenment, although the fit was never 
perfect in any epoch. Some medievalists also joined the fray, arguing in 
the opposite chronological direction that many medieval thinkers were 
often quite rational, and in that sense disenchanted, in their approach to 
magic.11 Most recently, scholars of modern magic have questioned 
                                                 
8 In contrast, on skepticism associated with witchcraft, mainly in the early modern 
period, see Walter Stephens, “The Sceptical Tradition,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe and Colonial America, ed. Brian P. Levack (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 101-21. Stephens’s important earlier study, Demon 
Lovers: Witchcraft, Sex, and the Crisis of Belief (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 
situated late medieval witchcraft at the center of major epistemological debates. 
9 Gilbert G. Germain, A Discourse on Disenchantment: Reflections on Politics and Technology 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 28. 
10 R. W. Scribner, “The Reformation, Popular Magic, and the ‘Disenchantment of the 
World,’” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 23 (1992-93): 475-94; also Scribner, “Magic and 
the Formation of Protestant Popular Culture in Germany,” in R. W. Scribner, Religion 
and Culture in Germany (1400-1800), ed. Lyndal Roper, Studies in Medieval and 
Reformation Thought 81 (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 323-45. A classic, highly nuanced 
account of the Reformation’s effect on magic remains Keith Thomas, Religion and the 
Decline of Magic (New York: Scribner’s, 1971). 
11 Richard Kieckhefer, “The Specific Rationality of Medieval Magic,” American Historical 
Review 99 (1994): 813-36; Michael D. Bailey, “The Disenchantment of Magic: Spells, 
Charms, and Superstition in Early European Witchcraft Literature,” American Historical 
Review 111 (2006): 383-404. 
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whether Western modernity itself can truly be categorized as 
disenchanted in any meaningful way.12 
Another reason why doubts about magic may not thus far have 
figured more prominently in the study of unbelief overall is that many 
of the scholars who have focused on different forms of medieval 
unbelief have tended to begin their investigations in the twelfth century, 
and they have often privileged the later medieval period over the 
earlier.13 This is due mainly to the impact of the intellectual revival still 
characterized as the “renaissance of the twelfth century,” which led to a 
flowering of disputation and hence of doubt, at least of the academic 
variety, on many issues. It is also likely due to the far greater number of 
sources available from the later medieval period compared to the 
earlier, which allows for greater insight into an array of issues. 
Collectively, although no doubt unintentionally, this de facto later 
medieval focus can appear to reinforce a teleology in which doubt and 
disbelief, as markers of intellectual sophistication, grew progressively as 
European society moved forward through time, from late medieval 
toward early modern. Belief in magic, however, followed a different 
track. 
Of course, the term “belief” is itself fluid and uncertain, and it can 
designate various kinds of conviction, credulity, or understanding.14 
Nevertheless, as a generality we may assert that most later medieval 
authorities – religious, judicial, and intellectual – tended to be more 
credulous, and hence more concerned, about magic than earlier 
authorities had been. More precisely, they grew more certain of the real 
efficacy of demonic magic within the physical world.15 One factor 
                                                 
12 Michael Saler, “Modernity and Enchantment: A Historiographic Review,” American 
Historical Review 111 (2006): 692-716; Egil Asprem, The Problem of Disenchantment: Scientific 
Naturalism and Esoteric Discourse, 1900-1939 (Leiden: Brill, 2014); Jason A. Josephson-
Storm, The Myth of Disenchantment: Magic, Modernity, and the Birth of the Human Sciences 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017). I approached the question from a 
medieval perspective in the final chapter of Michael D. Bailey, Fearful Spirits, Reasoned 
Follies: The Boundaries of Superstition in Late Medieval Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 2013), 242-50. 
13 Jinty Nelson, “Carolingian Doubt?” in Doubting Christianity, 65-86, at 66. 
14 On belief’s historical valences, see Ethan S. Shagan, The Birth of Modern Belief: Faith and 
Judgment from the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 2018). 
15 Michael D. Bailey, “Diabolic Magic,” in The Cambridge History of Magic and Witchcraft in 
the West: From Antiquity to the Present, ed. David J. Collins (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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underlying this development was the influx of erudite magical texts 
from the Muslim world, which was itself part of Western Europe’s 
intellectual revival starting around the twelfth century.16 By the late 
thirteenth or early fourteenth century, demonology had reemerged as a 
serious intellectual topic for the first time since the patristic era.17 By 
the fifteenth century, witch trials had begun to appear. This is not a 
trajectory that fits comfortably with most general approaches to the 
study of unbelief in the Middle Ages that have emerged so far. 
I lay out these points in order to establish the larger context for the 
focused analysis that I will develop here, but I will not, in fact, directly 
address such grand historical trajectories. To return for a moment to a 
Weberian frame, in a penetrating essay published in 2008, Alexandra 
Walsham argued that scholars should abandon the effort to situate 
disenchantment in any single age or epoch. Even more importantly, she 
stressed that we should not imagine that skepticism or disbelief grew 
progressively over time, advancing along a clearly “linear path of 
development.” Instead, we should think “in terms of cycles of 
desacralization and resacralization, disenchantment and re-
enchantment,” that would wax and wane over time.18 Within that 
framework, the imperative then becomes to understand how those 
cycles operated, and to do that, I would contend, we need to unpack 
the doubts and disbelief of particular historical moments, in order to 
understand how they functioned in their own terms rather than as part 
of any sweeping teleology.19 
                                                                                                       
University Press, 2015), 361-92, at 361-62. Although as David J. Collins stresses in his 
“Scholasticism and High Medieval Opposition to Magic,” in The Routledge History of 
Medieval Magic, ed. Sophie Page and Catherine Rider (London: Routledge, 2019), 461-74, 
there was no “unanimity in opinion or approach” to magic among scholastic thinkers 
(p. 461), and he effectively contrasts Thomas Aquinas’s demonic concerns to Albertus 
Magnus’s “more expansively accepting view” (pp. 467-69). 
16 Bailey, “Diabolic Magic,” 363; Collins, “Scholasticism and High Medieval 
Opposition,” 462-63; Richard Kieckhefer, Magic in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 117-19. 
17 Alain Boureau, Satan the Heretic: The Birth of Demonology in the Medieval West, trans. 
Teresa Lavender Fagan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 8-9. 
18 Alexandra Walsham, “The Reformation and ‘The Disenchantment of the World’ 
Reassessed,” The Historical Journal 51 (2008): 497-528, quote at 527. 
19 Although I would also agree with Walsham (“The Reformation and ‘The 
Disenchantment of the World,’” 528) that such precision should not “eclipse the fact of 
long-term change.” 
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My analysis here, therefore, takes the form of a case study. I will 
focus on the Carolingian archbishop Agobard of Lyon’s powerful 
statement of disbelief in a form of weather magic that was widely 
practiced, so he claimed, around that city in the early ninth century. As 
we will see, while his disbelief was unequivocal, it was not all-
encompassing. He did not reject the possibility of all kinds of magic, 
only certain practices that he sought to criticize. One aspect of my 
argument is that the manner in which Agobard structured and defended 
his disbelief can help us decipher how he came to hold the particular 
form of disbelief that he did. More broadly, I also want to show how 
disbelief does not always function as a simple antithesis to belief. 
Rather, these two seeming opposites could interact with and 
“implicate” each another in complex ways.20 Ultimately, it makes little 
sense to ask whether medieval people believed in magic or not. We 
should seek instead to understand the nature of both their belief and 
disbelief, what it entailed, and why. 
 
I. Magical beliefs around Lyon 
 
Compared to late medieval concerns, responses to magical practices in 
the early Middle Ages often seem admirably restrained and relatively 
skeptical. It is true that many early medieval law codes imposed harsh 
penalties particularly on magic used to cause harm, and this continued 
throughout the Carolingian period.21 Nevertheless, scholars have 
tended to emphasize the elements of doubt or disbelief expressed in 
various sources. Early medieval penitential literature, for example, 
frequently imposed penances not only for performing or participating 
in certain kinds of magical practices, but also for foolishly believing that 
they might be effective.22 Legal rulings, too, despite their potential 
                                                 
20 See Mathijs Pelkmans, “Outline for an Ethnography of Doubt,” in Ethnographies of 
Doubt: Faith and Uncertainty in Contemporary Societies, ed. Mathijs Pelkmans (London: I. B. 
Taurus, 2013), 1-42, at 2. 
21 E.g. a Carolingian code of 802: Alfred Boretius, ed., Capitularia regnum Francorum, 
Monumenta Germaniae Historica Leges 2 (Hanover: Hahn, 1883), 96. 
22 This is especially evident in the nineteenth book of Burchard of Worm’s Decretum, 
known as his Corrector; see Burchard, Decretorum libri viginti, Patrologia Latina 140 (Paris, 
1880), cols. 537-1058; also John T. McNeill and Helena M. Gamer, eds., Medieval 
Handbooks of Penance: A Translation of the Principal Libri Poenitentiales (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1938), 321-45. 
Magic and Disbelief in Carolingian Lyon 
 
183 
severity, often targeted incorrect or improper beliefs among the laity 
rather than the performance of magic per se. For example, a 
Carolingian capitulary from 785 seems to have been more intent on 
combatting residual paganism than on suppressing harmful magical 
rites when it condemned to death anyone who believed that a person 
could be a witch (striga) “after the manner of the pagans.”23 Such 
doubts were evident in church law as well. Perhaps most famously, the 
early tenth-century canon Episcopi concluded that women who believed 
themselves to travel at night in the train of the goddess Diana were in 
fact only deluded by demons.24 
This skeptical declaration was enormously influential, continuing to 
shape church authorities’ reaction to claims of witches flying through 
the night for the rest of the Middle Ages and beyond.25 Often 
overlooked, however, is that the canon’s disbelief did not extend at all 
to the “pernicious art of sorcery and harmful magic” in general. The 
text as it stands appears to have fully accepted that such practices were 
real, and it enjoined bishops and their officials to “eradicate” them 
from their diocese.26 Like the canon Episcopi, Agobard of Lyon’s tract 
De grandine et tonitruis (Concerning Hailstorms and Thunder) is now 
recognized as one of the major skeptical statements about magic from 
the early medieval period,27 and the good bishop himself is often 
                                                 
23 Boretius, ed., Capitularia regnum Francorum, 68. 
24 For edition, see n. 25 below. For discussion, see Valerie I. J. Flint, The Rise of Magic in 
Early Medieval Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), 122-26; Josef 
Steinruck, “Zauberei, Hexen- und Dämonenglaube im Sendhandbuch des Regino von 
Prüm,” in Hexenglaube und Hexenprozesse im Raum Rhein-Mosel-Saar, ed. Gunther Franz 
and Franz Irsigler (Trier: Spee, 1995), 3-18; and Werner Tschacher, “Der Flug durch 
die Luft zwischen Illusionstheorie und Realitätsbeweis: Studien zum sog. Kanon 
Episcopi und zum Hexenflug,” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte 116, 
Kanonistische Abteilung 85 (1999), 225-76, which takes analysis up through the later 
medieval period. 
25 For the fullest discussion of the canon’s reception in the fifteenth century, see 
Martine Ostorero, Le diable au sabbat: Littérature démonologique et sorcellerie (1440-1460), 
Micrologus’ Library 38 (Florence: SISMEL, 2011), 567-720. 
26 Joseph Hansen, ed., Quellen und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Hexenwahns und der 
Hexenverfolgung im Mittelalter (1901; reprint Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1963), 38-39. 
27 The title is not Agobard’s. It derives from an addition to the sole known manuscript, 
Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Lat. 2853, fols. 93r-106r: Item liber contra insulam 
uulgi opinionem de grandine et tonitruis. I follow the edition in Agobardi Lugdunensis opera 
omnia, ed. L. van Aker, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis 52 (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 1981), 3-15 (hereafter DGT). A partial translation is found in Paul Edward 
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credited as being almost modern in his rational and empirical 
approach.28 As with the canon, however, we will see that his disbelief 
was in fact carefully focused. 
Information about Agobard’s life, especially before he became 
archbishop, is sketchy and uncertain. According to the Annals of Lyon, 
he came from Spain (Hispania) to southern Gaul (Gallia Narbonensis) in 
782. A decade later, he appears to have settled in Lyon. The Annals are 
not entirely trustworthy on all points, but at the very least, Agobard 
appears not to have been a Frank. Seemingly more certain is that he 
succeeded to the archbishopric of Lyon after the resignation of his 
predecessor, Leidrad, and he was confirmed in this office by a synod at 
Aachen in 816.29 Like Leidrad, Agobard was dedicated to ecclesiastical 
reform, and he was clearly concerned about the moral instruction and 
improvement of his flock. Seemingly toward this goal, he wrote De 
grandine et tonitruis sometime between 815 and 817, at the very outset of 
his episcopate. This short work appears to be of mixed genre. It most 
likely began as a sermon preached to a lay audience but then 
increasingly took on the nature of a learned treatise, emphasizing 
scriptural citation and meant most likely for other clergy to read.30 
Agobard begins this tract with the sweeping declaration that “nearly 
everyone” in the region around Lyon, “nobles and commoners, city-
dwellers and country-folk, the old and the young, think that hail and 
thunder can be made at the will of human beings.” This belief is 
entirely false, however, a position he asserts “without doubt.”31 In fact, 
he articulates a fairly complicated three-part belief structure. First, there 
are the people he labels tempestarii (storm-raisers) who supposedly 
                                                                                                       
Dutton, ed., Carolingian Civilization: A Reader, 2nd ed. (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview 
Press, 2004), 220-23. While I have consulted Dutton, translations here are my own. 
28 See esp. Karl Heidecker, “Agobard en de onweermakers: Magie en rationaliteit in de 
vroege Middeleeuwen,” in De betovering van het middeleeuwse Christendom: Studies over ritueel 
en magie in de Middeleeuwen, ed. M. Mostert and A. Demyttenaere (Hilversum: Verloren, 
1995), 171-94. Earlier examples include Allen Cabaniss, Agobard of Lyons: Churchman and 
Critic (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1953), 25; and Egon Boshof, Erzbischof 
Agobard von Lyon: Leben und Werk (Cologne: Böhlau, 1969), 173. 
29 Boshof, Agobard von Lyon, 24-36. 
30 Boshof, Agobard von Lyon, 170; Jean Jolivet, “Agobard de Lyon et les faiseurs de 
pluie,” in La méthode critique au Moyen Âge, ed. Mireille Chazan and Gilbert Dahan 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), 15-25, at 25. 
31 DGT 1, p. 3. 
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employed incantations to summon violent storms to destroy crops.32 
Then there are other practitioners who cannot raise storms but claim to 
be able to defend against them, for which they exact a payment from 
the local populace in the form of a regular tribute or tithe.33 Most 
strangely, he describes an entirely different sort of people who come 
from a land called Magonia, and who pilot ships through the air. 
Apparently without power to affect the weather themselves, these 
people pay the tempestarii for raising storms, and in turn they steal the 
crops damaged in those storms and transport them back to Magonia.34 
Recent scholarship has tended to focus on the social context behind 
these contested beliefs.35 Paul Dutton, for example, has argued that 
they may represent a peasant strategy, or Agobard’s encoding of such a 
strategy, to hide crops and resist both seigneurial taxes and ecclesiastical 
tithes.36 As for the beliefs themselves, he suggests that they were rooted 
in pagan weather rites and perhaps even the enduring worship of pagan 
weather deities.37 Others see no reason to posit active paganism in the 
heart of ninth-century Francia. Given how many ecclesiastical rites 
aimed at crop protection, Rob Meens has suggested that Agobard 
might have been engaged in a rhetoric targeting rival clerics.38 Probably 
the most likely explanation is more straightforward, that Agobard was 
challenging popular magical beliefs and perhaps even a set of 
                                                 
32 This term was in widespread use by Frankish writers at this time; for a list, see 
Heidecker, “Agobard en de onweermakers,” 189-92; also Paul Edward Dutton, 
“Thunder and Hail over the Carolingian Countryside,” in Dutton, Charlemagne’s Mustache 
and Other Cultural Clusters of a Dark Age (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 169-88 
and 264-72, at 172-74; Bernadette Filotas, Pagan Survivals, Superstitions and Popular 
Cultures in Early Medieval Pastoral Literature (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2005), 270-73. 
33 DGT 15, p. 14. 
34 DGT 2, p. 4. On possible meanings or derivations of this term, see Heidecker, 
“Agobard en de onweermakers,” 179; Dutton, “Thunder and Hail,” 174, 186; Filotas, 
Pagan Survivals 273-74. 
35 Jolivet, “Agobard de Lyon,” focuses on “methods of argumentation” but offers 
mainly summary with little analysis. 
36 Dutton, “Thunder and Hail,” 186. 
37 Dutton, “Thunder and Hail,” 174; also Heidecker “Agobard en de onweermakers,” 180. 
38 Rob Meens, “Thunder over Lyon: Agobard, the tempestarii and Christianity,” in 
Paganism in the Middle Ages: Threat and Fascination, ed. Carlos Steel, John Marenbon, and 
Werner Verbeke (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2012), 157-66, at 164. See 
Heidecker, “Agobard en de onweermakers,” 180-82, on ecclesiastical weather rites. 
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“independent village sorcerers” who represented an obstacle to full 
ecclesiastical control over rural culture.39  
What concerns me in this essay, however, is not so much what 
Agobard was opposing in his tract, or even why, but rather how he 
constructed that opposition. What arguments did he use to disrupt the 
supposedly near-universal belief in the weather magic of the tempestarii, 
what kinds of doubt did he bring into play, and what do these reveal 
about the ultimate nature of his own disbelief? The position he 
announces in his tract can be summarized easily enough: God controls 
the weather, human beings cannot. He intends to prove this mainly 
through scripture. There is another strand of argumentation woven 
through De grandine et tonitruis, however, in which Agobard draws on his 
own observation and investigation of the beliefs that he wants to 
challenge. Many scholars have noted this other line of argument, which 
has contributed greatly to Agobard’s reputation as a deeply rational and 
for some an almost proto-modern thinker.40 Introducing modern 
notions of rationality or irrationality into discussions of medieval magic 
is rarely edifying, but there is no doubt that two very different kinds of 
skepticism and opposition to weather magic are evident here. 
In the tract as we have it, arguments against the tempestarii drawn 
from Agobard’s own experience appear only as relatively brief asides or 
digressions from his scriptural analysis. I will argue, however, that they 
actually represent the core of his disbelief. Others have noted how his 
text sits oddly between a popular sermon, in which one would expect 
colorful contemporary exempla, and a more learned treatise, built around 
systematic argumentation and the citation of past authorities.41 
Obviously, the direction of the text’s development would more likely 
have been from an earlier oral form toward a later literary one. I will 
pursue that insight, and the suggestion that the “traces of orality” 
remaining in the text represent its point of origin.42 Specifically 
regarding Agobard’s adamant disbelief in the weather magic of the 
tempestarii, I will show how some of the scriptural citations that he 
marshalled to his cause could actually be read as supporting the idea of 
                                                 
39 Monica Blöcker, “Wetterzauber: Zu einem Glaubenskomplex des frühen 
Mittelalters,” Francia 9 (1981): 117-31, at 125. 
40 See n. 27 above. 
41 Jolivet, “Agobard de Lyon”; followed by Meens, “Thunder Over Lyon.” 
42 Meens, “Thunder Over Lyon,” 160; Boshof, Agobard von Lyon, 170. 
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human control over weather via demonic magic, and indeed that they 
were read that way by many other medieval churchmen. 
 
II. Agobard’s Scriptural critique 
 
The bulk of Agobard’s scriptural arguments are drawn from two books 
of the Old Testament: Exodus and Job. From Exodus, his key example 
concerns Moses and Aaron’s encounter with Pharaoh, and in particular 
their calling forth, through the power of God, of the seventh plague 
upon Egypt, that of hail.43 As Agobard relates, citing scripture, “Moses 
stretched forth his rod toward heaven, and the Lord sent thunder and 
hail and lightning running along the ground, and the Lord rained hail 
on the land of Egypt.” He ends with his own comment, explicitly 
articulating the conclusion he wants to draw from this passage; namely, 
that it “shows the Lord alone as creator and author of the hail, not 
some human being.”44 
Not everyone would interpret this passage in this way, however, as 
Agobard himself goes on to note. “Perhaps they who attribute this to 
human beings,” he writes, “might say that Moses stretched forth his 
rod toward heaven, and therefore the storm was sent by a man.” This 
objection actually plays into Agobard’s hands. A standard position 
within medieval Christian discourse was that holy people might indeed 
appear to work wonders, but they never did so through their own 
power, only God’s. Such reasoning lies at the root of Agobard’s 
response. “Surely Moses was a good and just servant of the Lord,” he 
writes, “but these would not dare claim that those whom they call 
tempestarii are good and just, but rather evil and unjust, and deserving of 
condemnation now and forever.” Thus, the power of the tempestarii 
cannot be real, “for if, in imitation of Moses, these men were the 
authors of the hail, they would surely be servants of God, not servants 
of the devil.”45 
Later in De grandine et tonitruis, Agobard would also recount how the 
prophet Elijah once prayed for a drought to afflict Israel, and the Lord 
withheld rain for more than three years.46 He would go on to expound 
                                                 
43 Exodus 9:22-26. 
44 DGT 5, p. 6. 
45 DGT 5, p. 6. 
46 DGT 10, p. 10; from 3 Kings 17:1, although here Agobard references James 5:17-18. 
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the power of prayer generally. Yet the tempestarii were not piously 
praying for the storms that they were believed to raise. Rather, they 
operated through “evil magic tricks.”47 The wording here was no doubt 
precisely intended, for Agobard does not refer to maleficium, or to 
incantationes as he did at the outset of his tract, but to praestigia mala, and 
Carolingian authorities associated praestigium with deception and 
demonic illusion.48 The point, therefore, is not just that the actions of 
the tempestarii in this instance are wicked or ungodly, but that they are 
ineffective, illusory, and unreal. As Agobard writes, “a sinner 
cannot…raise up the wind, as you tend to say, because he does not 
have the power, nor can he command evil angels, although in this 
matter they would not have power either.”49 
That last point is a curious claim for Agobard to build into his 
argument, for other early medieval authorities absolutely believed that 
demons had power over the air, or at least that they could receive such 
power from God. Indeed, from at least the late ninth or early tenth 
centuries, rites for consecrating church bells regularly referred to their 
power to dispel storms by terrifying and driving away the demons that 
caused these aerial disturbances.50 Agobard, too, admits that demons 
have such power, albeit very briefly. After his discussion of hail in 
Exodus, he references Psalm 77, which ruminated on the Egyptian 
plagues, writing that “the Psalmist, too, who recalled this hail, says 
about God: He destroyed their vineyards with hail and their mulberry 
trees with hoarfrost. And he gave up their cattle to the hail and their 
possessions to the fire.” But Agobard does not stop there. Instead, he 
writes how, “seeing that the Psalmist adds there ‘sent by evil angels,’ it 
is clear that God may employ the scourge of punishment or trial 
through evil ministers.”51 Moreover, he states almost immediately 
                                                 
47 DGT 11, p. 11. 
48 See, for example, the condemnation of various kinds of magical practices at the 829 
Council of Paris: Albert Werminghoff, ed., Concilia aevi Karolini, Monumenta Germaniae 
Historica Concilia 2.2 (Hanover: Hahn, 1908), 669; Filotas, Pagan Survivals, 221, 312. 
49 DGT 11, p. 11. 
50 John H. Arnold and Caroline Goodson, “Resounding Community: The History and 
Meaning of Medieval Church Bells,” Viator 43 (2011): 99-130, at 118-19. 
51 DGT 5, p. 6. More than a decade later, Agobard returned to this same passage from 
Psalms in order to emphasize the power of demons as agents of divine wrath: “For 
blows against the impious and unfaithful are inflicted by evil angels, which the Psalmist, 
speaking of the plagues which struck Egypt, explicitly states, saying: He sent upon them 
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thereafter that storm-raising “is certainly not in the power of human 
beings, either good or evil, nor is it in the power of opposing forces, 
but of God alone, who grants power to their evil will insofar as he 
wishes.”52 To argue that demonic magic could only be effective if 
allowed by God did not necessarily undercut the real effectiveness of 
that magic. Indeed, the idea that demonic magic only functioned 
through God’s ultimate permission was axiomatic in most church 
authorities’ treatment of magical arts in the early medieval period,53 and 
it would continue to be through later Christian demonology as well. 
Neither did Agobard seek to deny real power to human magicians in 
all circumstances. When beginning his account of Moses and Aaron’s 
confrontation with Pharaoh in Exodus, he also introduced Jannes and 
Jambres, “the spell-casters [incantatores] of the Egyptians, who are 
described as magicians [magi],” and who clearly had real power, at least 
up to a point.54 When Aaron threw down his rod before Pharaoh and it 
transformed into a serpent, they matched this feat, although Aaron’s 
serpent devoured theirs. They also matched Moses and Aaron fully 
during the first plague, turning the waters of Egypt red with blood. 
Again during the second plague they were able to call forth frogs from 
the rivers, just as Moses and Aaron had, although as Agobard stresses, 
“they were not able to send them back [into the rivers], as Moses did 
through the word of the Lord.” Only during the third plague would 
their power fail completely: “But when it came to gnats, and they were 
not able to do anything, they said that the finger of God was against 
them, and they attempted nothing more.”55 
Clearly, Agobard did not think that acknowledging the reality of 
Jannes and Jambres’ power, in certain circumstances, was detrimental 
to his overall argument. In fact, he turned it to his advantage, asserting 
that “surely if any man could cast hail, Jannes and Jambres would have 
cast it, because they turned water into blood, and they produced frogs 
from the rivers, which they who now are called tempestarii cannot do.”56 
                                                                                                       
the wrath of his indignation; indignation, and wrath, and tribulation sent by evil angels.” 
Agobard, De quorundam inlusione signorum 8, in Opera omnia, p. 241. 
52 DGT 5, p. 6. 
53 Benedikt Marxreiter, Bern von Reichenau, De nigromantia seu divinatione daemonum 
contemnenda: Edition und Untersuchung (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2016), 153-56. 
54 The pair remains unnamed in Exodus but are so called in 2 Timothy 3:8. 
55 DGT 4, p. 5. 
56 DGT 4, pp. 5-6. 
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The two magicians disappear from Exodus after the third plague, except 
for a brief mention during the sixth plague that “neither could the 
sorcerers [malefici] stand before Moses because of the boils that were 
upon them.”57 They are not mentioned at all in regard to the plague of 
hail, and Agobard clearly wants to infer from their absence that they 
were incapable of conjuring hail themselves. Strictly speaking, however, 
Exodus never describes Jannes and Jambres reaching some inherent 
limit to their power, only that their magic failed when the Lord 
opposed it, when “the finger of God was against them.” 
A similar kind of complication troubles Agobard’s arguments drawn 
from the Book of Job, which he cites in two different sections of De 
grandine et tonitruis.58 The first focuses narrowly on one passage from 
Jobi37, which describes God manipulating the weather and particularly 
describes the clouds going “wherever the will of God governing them 
shall lead.”59 “How else can this be understood,” Agobard asserts, 
except that God alone controls the weather. He concludes again that no 
human beings can wield such power, other than the saints, who receive 
their power from God.60 
A central message of the Book of Job, however, is that God acts in 
inscrutable ways. He does not always grant power to saints, nor does he 
always reward the just. Instead, he gives Satan power to afflict Job, and 
Agobard himself, in a later work in which he was concerned to show 
that not all apparently wondrous events stemmed directly from God, 
wrote concerning Job’s afflictions that “no one doubts that this was 
done by the ministry of Satan.”61 Throughout later medieval 
demonology, as well, the Book of Job would be one of the favorite 
scriptural sources cited to prove the reality of demonic power in the 
world. For example, more than half a millennium after Agobard, the 
early fifteenth-century Dominican demonologist Johannes Nider would 
rely on the example of Job to demonstrate precisely the point that 
“demons and their disciples can [really] perform such witchcraft by 
                                                 
57 Exodus 9:11. 
58 DGT 9, pp. 9-10; 13-14, pp. 12-13. 
59 Job 37:12. 
60 DGT 9, p. 10. 
61 Agobard, De quorundam inlusione signorum 6, p. 240. 
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means of lightning, hailstorms, and the like…which some doubt.”62 By 
that time, the capacity of demons to control the weather was firmly 
established in scholastic theology, and Nider was also able to draw on 
the authority of Thomas Aquinas to prove that “demons can cause a 
disturbance in the air, rouse the winds, and make fire fall from the sky” 
because these occurrences are ultimately generated through the 
movement of vapors in the atmosphere, and dominion over such 
things falls within the “natural power of a demon.”63 
Centuries earlier, Augustine of Hippo had already established the 
notion of power being granted to demons in order to test the faithful 
and allow them to show their valor through their endurance of 
sufferings.64 Although he never cited Augustine, Agobard could not 
entirely escape the implications so apparent in the story of Job’s 
afflictions. In his second discussion of the Book of Job, Agobard puts 
it thus: “He [God] granted him [Satan] power first over all his 
possessions, then over his children, then over the health of his body, 
thereafter to persuade his wife, and finally in the reproach and manifold 
disdain of his servants.” Ultimately, all this demonic action fulfills 
God’s will. Job is tested and humbled, but in the end “the devil 
withdrew conquered and confused, [and] the servant of God emerged 
the victor and triumphant.”65 Still, that happy ending does not change 
the fact that, under the overarching blanket of God’s majesty, the devil 
could wield considerable power in the world. We have already seen 
how, in response to the Psalms, Agobard acknowledged that God 
might grant power over storms to demons, in order to use them as 
instruments of divine wrath. Likewise, he admitted that even the 
tempestarii might, under certain circumstances, act as “servants of God,” 
although never “through voluntary servitude.”66 
It is important to remember, at this juncture, that Agobard was not 
constructing an argument about the limited or constrained nature of the 
tempestarii’s power. He was asserting that they could never, under any 
                                                 
62 Nider, Formicarius 5.4, in L’imaginaire du sabbat: Edition critique des texts les plus anciens 
(1430 c.-1440 c.), ed. Martine Ostorero, Agostino Paravicini Bagliani, and Kathrin Utz 
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Université de Lausanne, 1999), 170-72. 
63 Ostorero et al., ed., Imaginaire, 172; from Aquinas, Expositio super Iob ad litteram 1.3. 
64 Augustine, De civitate dei 10.21. 
65 DGT 13, p. 12. 
66 DGT 5, p. 6. 
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circumstances, do what people believed they did. Yet some of his 
scriptural citations could be read as calling that extreme position into 
doubt. Agobard moved quickly past such possibilities because, I would 
suggest, his own disbelief arose from a different source, visible in other 
aspects of his argumentation in De grandine et tonitruis. In the course of 
developing this tract, he turned to scriptural citations to augment the 
authority of his disbelief, but they are not its real root. Let me now turn 
to his other line of argumentation, which takes the form of brief 
empirical asides interspersed throughout his scriptural analysis, and 
examine how it functions. 
 
III. Agobard’s experience with weather magic 
 
Agobard’s most direct encounter with the world of the tempestarii 
occurred when, so he claims, he came upon a sizeable crowd, either in 
Lyon itself or in the vicinity. They were gathered around four people 
who had been placed in chains and who appeared to Agobard to have 
been detained thus for several days. The crowd believed that these 
people were aerial sailors from Magonia who had fallen out of their 
ship. Those who had initially captured them were now apparently 
whipping up the crowd into a furor in order to kill the prisoners, for 
Agobard describes them as looking “just like those going to be stoned.” 
At this crucial point, however, the archbishop intervened and somehow 
managed to convince the crowd of its error. Unfortunately, he does not 
relate exactly how he did this, stating only that “the truth won out. 
After much argument, those who displayed them [the prisoners] were 
confounded, just as, according to the prophet, the thief is confounded 
when he is apprehended.”67 Of course, this encounter may have been 
entirely invented, but if it or something like it really happened, it may 
represent the kernel from which the rest of Agobard’s disbelief in the 
tempestarii grew.68 
The incident with the prisoners appears near the beginning of 
Agobard’s tract. Somewhat later, after he had begun to develop his 
scriptural analysis, he would pause briefly in that line of argumentation 
to wonder why, if the tempestarii could really control the weather as 
people claimed, they would limit themselves to destroying crops. If they 
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truly wanted to harm their neighbors, why not just kill them by 
dumping great piles of hail on them directly, rather than on their fields? 
This should have been within their power, for “some say that they 
themselves know such tempestarii as can cause scattered hail falling 
widely across a region to come down in one place in a river or barren 
woods, or, so they say, on a tub under which he himself [the 
tempestarius] is hiding.”69 Agobard also notes at this point that, if the 
tempestarii could really conjure destructive hail, surely they could also 
make it rain.70 Then in a later aside he wonders why farmers do not 
seek out these magicians in times of drought, to save their fields rather 
than to destroy them.71 Since the tempestarii were thought to receive 
payment from the Magonians to create storms and ruin crops, it would 
only make sense that they would be willing to perform other 
meteorological services for a fee. 
Agobard’s ultimate empirical argument, however, is not that the 
tempestarii fail to act in various ways that would make sense, if they 
indeed wielded the sort of power that people claimed for them. It is 
instead that no one has actually witnessed them performing any kind of 
operation whatsoever. Here he relates a bit of his own sleuthing. 
Having heard of someone who claimed to have seen the tempestarii 
performing their rites, he “went through great effort” to track the man 
down. He then implored and even “bound him with the threat of 
divine punishment” to tell only the truth. At this, the man retreated 
slightly from his claims, stating that he knew a certain tempestarius, 
whom he named, and a particular time and place at which that man had 
supposedly conjured storms, “but he confessed that he himself had not 
been present at that time.”72 This absence of eyewitness testimony 
seems to have played a major role in convincing Agobard of the 
inherent falsity of all claims about the tempestarii, or at least he presents 
it as very damning evidence against their claims to real power. 
Yet Agobard was also willing to discount testamentary evidence 
when it challenged his own empirical observations or reasoned 
conclusions. At the very end of De grandine et tonitruis he presents 
another incident of harmful magic, widely accepted at the time, which 
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he nevertheless categorically denies had ever taken place. Although it 
has nothing to do with weather magic, he frames it as a suitable 
conclusion to his argument about the tempestarii because it is “similar to 
this about which we speak.”73 Indeed, the incident in question shares 
much in common, at least as Agobard presents it, with his account of 
the tempestarii. Once again certain people claim to have committed an 
act of harmful, destructive magic that Agobard insists could not be real. 
Here he attacks not only the possibility of the malefic magic in 
question, in this case poisoning, but even more he focuses on what he 
sees as the preposterous scale of the act and the impossible logistics 
that it would have entailed. 
The incident to which I am referring is this: a few years before 
Agobard sat down to write De grandine et tonitruis, in 810, an extensive 
murrain had struck the Carolingian world.74 There was no denying the 
terrible reality of this epidemic. What remained was to explain how it 
came about. Rumor spread that Grimoald IV, the ruler of Benevento 
and an enemy of the emperor Charlemagne, had dispatched agents 
throughout Frankish lands to scatter a poisonous powder that killed 
cattle. Many of his supposed agents were arrested, and moreover many 
of them confessed to having acted as poisoners, a fact which Agobard 
found truly “remarkable.” We know from his report that torture was 
employed, and for modern sensibilities that alone might explain a false 
confession. The archbishop of Lyon, however, advanced a different 
explanation, “for the devil, having received power over them by the 
hidden and just judgment of God, was able to enter into them, so that 
they gave false testimony against themselves, even unto death.”75 
Like the claims of the tempestarii, these reports of enemy agents 
dispersing poisonous powders were “believed by everyone” and “there 
were very few to whom it seemed absurd.” Agobard, of course, was 
among those who did find it absurd, but unlike with the tempestarii, here 
he did not mount his own investigation or seek any evidence either to 
confirm or to counter the confessions of the convicted poisoners. 
Instead he simply pointed to what he regarded as the ridiculous nature 
of their claims. “They did not consider rationally how such powder 
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could be made, by which only cattle would be killed, not other animals, 
or how such powder could be carried over such very broad regions.” 
Not if every man, woman, and child in Benevento had gone forth with 
cartloads of such powder, he asserted, could such widespread poisoning 
possibly have been accomplished.76 
 
IV. The source of Agobard’s skepticism 
 
The kind of conjectural, almost gut-level reaction to what he regarded 
as outlandish claims evident in Agobard’s dismissal of the rumored 
mass-poisoning of cattle seems to be the real root of his opposition to 
belief in the tempestarii and their weather magic as well. Although he 
ultimately wrote a tract that argued mainly from scripture, it was not 
biblical analysis that instilled in him his absolute disbelief in their 
power. Indeed, certain parts of scripture could have called the level of 
his disbelief into doubt, but the good bishop either bent them to his 
rhetorical purpose when he could, or simply pushed past them in his 
analysis. Instead, he appears to have responded first and most directly 
to some of the more peculiar claims about the tempestarii that, he says, 
were being made around Lyon, and which he regarded as especially 
ludicrous. If they could be so accurate in their conjurations as to hit an 
overturned tub, why then did they not assassinate individual people 
who irked them through highly directed bursts of hail? If they received 
payment from the aerial sailors of Magonia to destroy crops, then why 
not try to generate some kind of income from the many farmers who 
would no doubt willingly pay them for rain in times of drought? 
We can only speculate about what arguments Agobard may have 
used to convince an angry crowd to release the group of supposed 
Magonians that it had captured, but it seems likely that he regarded the 
whole notion of sky-ships and aerial sailors as utter nonsense as well. 
There is essentially no reference to Magonia in early medieval texts 
outside of De grandine et tonitruis,77 presumably indicating that, while 
belief in tempestarii was widespread across the Carolingian world, this 
particular appendage to that belief structure was quite localized around 
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Lyon. If so, then the sophisticated and worldly archbishop would have 
had all the more reason to find it highly risible. In fact, one expert has 
even speculated that Magonia might be Agobard’s “own satirical 
coinage.”78 Another scholar has suggested a broader connection; 
namely, that the term might be related to maones or mavones, which in at 
least a couple of other eighth- and ninth-century texts designated spirits 
(manes) that stole crops from the fields.79 Yet there is nothing in those 
beliefs to suggest the notion of aerial ships carrying real, physical 
people who could be bound in chains – an idea that itself had at least 
some life outside of Agobard’s description, but was not otherwise 
connected to weather magic in any way.80 
Of course, we might also assume that Agobard invented not only 
the term Magonia but also the underlying beliefs that he claimed the 
term entailed, at least in the context of Lyon. The story of his 
encounter with the mob might have been a self-serving fiction as well. I 
find it unlikely, however, that the archbishop would have fabricated 
such details from whole cloth, especially in a text that probably began 
as a sermon preached to local audiences. This line of analysis puts me, 
therefore, in the camp of those who see Agobard as an at least 
somewhat reliable observer, and reasonably honest reporter, of 
common magical beliefs actually present in and around Lyon in the 
early ninth century.81 It also leads to a conclusion applicable to 
                                                 
78 Dutton, “Thunder and Hail,” 174. 
79 Filotas, Pagan Survivals, 80-81, 273. Or possibly magonia was related to mangones, a term 
used in Carolingian legal texts to designate entirely mundane peddlers, swindlers, or 
thieves: ibid., 220, 273-74 
80 In the early thirteenth century, Gervase of Tilbury recorded an event “from our 
time” (temporibus nostris) in which an anchor from such a ship became lodged against a 
tombstone just outside a church. As the parishioners gathered around, a sailor climbed 
down to free it but was seized by the crowd and suffocated in the thick air closer to the 
earth, just as a human being would suffocate under water. References to such air ships 
are found in Celtic legends recorded at least as early as 748. See Gervase of Tilbury, 
Otia imperialia: Recreation for an Emperor, ed. and trans. S. E. Banks and J. W. Burns 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 80-81. I thank Joel Lipson of Cambridge University 
for this reference. I am also grateful to Gabriella Baika of the Florida Institute of 
Technology, who is studying the cultural meaning of Magonia from Agobard’s time to 
the present, and who has generously shared some of her findings with me. 
81 Heidecker, “Agobard en de onweermakers,” 172; Jolivet, “Agobard de Lyon,” 15. 
More generally see Filotas, Pagan Survivals, 46-48; Rob Meens, “Magic and the Early 
Medieval World View,” in The Community, the Family, and the Saint: Patterns of Power in 
Early Medieval Europe, ed. Joyce Hill and Mary Swan (Turnhout: Brepols, 1998), 285-95. 
Magic and Disbelief in Carolingian Lyon 
 
197 
educated clerical authorities throughout the Middle Ages; namely, that 
they were often skeptical not so much about the possibility of magic 
per se as about the claims made by ordinary, uneducated laypeople 
regarding magical practices. My goal, however, has not been to discover 
some startlingly new mode of skepticism operating uniquely in Lyon in 
the early ninth century, but rather to examine carefully how different 
forms of doubt grounded in experience, authority (scripture), and 
rational conjecture could intertwine to produce one particularly 
powerful expression of disbelief. 
Although experts are fully aware that certain kinds of magic 
generated considerable doubt and disbelief throughout the Middle 
Ages, they rarely approach the topic of magic directly from this angle. 
The utility of examining magic in terms of doubt, uncertainty, and 
outright disbelief has, so far, been more evident in studies focused on 
the modern period, where these are often seen as the default positions 
that most people would, or should, take. What those studies have 
increasingly shown, however, is that doubt or disbelief are never simply 
antithetical to continued belief in magic; rather, they are an essential 
part of magic’s inherently uncertain nature.82 Recently Claire Fanger has 
argued that such “ambiguity” should be central to our understanding of 
medieval magic as well.83 This essay has sought to take a step in that 
direction. The better we understand the particular nature of medieval 
disbelief(s) in magic, the better we will understand the relationship 
between magic and other varieties of unbelief, both in the Middle Ages 
and beyond. We will also better understand how belief and disbelief 
interacted in varying ways to help form the larger patterns of 
continually fluctuating disenchantment and re-enchantment that 
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